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STRUGGLING TO BE HEARD: THE  
PAST AND PRESENT OF  
EMPLOYEE VOICE IN BELARUS  
 
Hanna Danilovich 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses a highly under-research question of employee voice in 
Belarus using labour process theory, specifically, Ramsay’s (1977) cycles of con-
trol theory to assess the evolution of voice at transitional periphery. Using the 
sample of 10 industrial enterprises, the paper explores the degree of manage-
ment control over formal voice and the role of trade unions in defending of inde-
pendent voice at the collective level. Informal voice at the individual level is also 
analysed. The findings demonstrate that the degree of direct control over formal 
voice in Belarus exceeds that in the Soviet Union due to suppression of inde-
pendent trade union voice. The loss of workers’ control over the labour process 
has led to decreasing informal voice at the individual level. However, the earlier 
argument on workers’ patience is not supported due to a growing number of or-
ganised workers protests. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The chapter analyses employee voice in Belarus, one of the economies of the 
post-Soviet ‘transitional periphery’ (Wood and Demirbag, 2015). Research on 
employee voice and worker representation in Belarus has been scarce due to its 
political sensitivity to the government of ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’ 
(Marples, 2005; Wilson, 2011; Babaev, 2013). Shedding light on these hushed up 
areas of labour relations helps understanding the social agreement in the country. 
This, in turn, allows to pinpoint the reasons for workers’ passivity in the face of 
constantly worsening working and economic conditions and increasing repres-
sion of any forms of industrial democracy not in one single country, but across 
the whole transitional periphery where Soviet ideological legacies still affect in-
stitutional and social development.  
The devolution of employee voice in the former Soviet economies is largely 
determined by a strong history of repression, starting from a direct oppression of 
worker representation in the Russian Empire, to an implicit, but equally power-
ful, restraint of employee voice in the Soviet Union, and a de jure freedom but a 
de facto suppression of industrial democracy by the majority of post-Soviet polit-
ical regimes.  
Soviet Union was initially created with the ‘workers’ state’ ideology in mind 
(Kliuchko, 2007). This implied incorporating employee voice into the decision 
making mechanism through worker-elected trade union representation at both the 
enterprise and the national level. However, the ideology of bureaucratic pluralism 
that dominated Soviet industrial relations only allowed the voice to be expressed 
through state-approved unions, fully integrated in the Party and government 
structures (Godson, 1981). The claim usually resulted in bonus stripping and/or 
demotion rather than protection of one’s rights, creating the culture of employee 
silence and facilitating widespread corruption among enterprise management. 
The situation improved during the second half of the 1980s when the relaxa-
tion of political regime in the Soviet Union created new institutional opportuni-
ties for the expression of formal employee voice. However, within the decade 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, weak democratic traditions in most newly 
independent countries were suppressed by authoritarian regimes (Cameron and 
Ornstein, 2011; Silitski, 2010a, 2010b) and the Soviet-style model of industrial 
relations with trade unions as governmental institutional structures, rather than 
independent political force, was established.  
Belarus represents an excellent example of such ‘reversed transition’ (Karba-
levich, 2001; Westover, 2013; Babaev, 2013). Having been classified as a con-
solidated authoritarian regime by the Freedom House since 2003, with the aver-
age democracy score of 6.64
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 over 13 years of observations, Belarus is character-
ised by high levels of institutional corruption, a near total absence of independent 
media, repressed civil society, powerless local and national democratic govern-
ance and the absence of independent judiciary (for detailed references see e.g., 
Nations in Transit, 2004, 2015). Theoretically, the expression of employee voice 
through institutional channels is permitted by the country’s Constitution. The re-
ality, however, demonstrates a different picture. Officially recognised trade un-
ions represented by the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions are the legacy of 
the Soviet Union. They remain a ‘transmission belt’, representing the interests of 
the management and the state rather than the workforce. The democratic unions, 
independent from the state, which have emerged after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, exist on a semi-legal basis, and as such lack both financial and 
organising capacity to fully represent the Belarusian labour force.  
The weakness of formal representative institutions makes one wonder whether 
employee voice is even possible under such conditions, by what means it is real-
ised, and to what degree the workers are prepared to accept their current role at 
the workplace. The issue is further complicated by the scant research available. 
Employee voice has never been investigated in-depth in academic studies on 
Belarus. Most previous research on the Belarussian workforce is represented by 
macro-level overviews (see e.g., Gaiduk et al., 2005, 2006; Sokolova, 2011, 
2012; Vankevich et al., 2008; Vankevich, 2010; Van Klaveren et al., 2010). Re-
cent research undertaken at the enterprise level (see e.g., Danilovich, Croucher 
and Makovskaya, 2015; Danilovich and Croucher, 2015) has focused more on 
human resource management-related issues and only briefly explored employee 
voice with respect to management decision-making.  
The chapter addresses a severely under-researched problem of employee voice 
in Belarus by analysing first-hand information obtained from semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews with individual workers, HR managers, and representa-
tives of democratic trade unions. The current occurrence of employee voice is 
viewed as a direct result of power imbalances within industrial relations. Alt-
hough trade union movement at transitional periphery was largely suppressed by 
the newly emerged authoritarian regimes and became the part of political elites, 
small ‘democratic’ unions remain in some countries, including Belarus, creating 
certain opportunities for an independent workers’ voice. In a number of coun-
tries, large-scale protests were organised by workers both with and without trade 
union involvement (see e.g., Yessenova, 2007; Ziegler, 2010; Salmon, 2011; 
Dudarev, 2013; Petrov and Gafarly, 2013; Marat, 2014 on Central Asia; Shalam-
beridze, 2012 on Georgia).  
The concepts of conflict, control and consent, as defined by the labour process 
theory (e.g., Ramsay, 1977; Friedman, 1977; Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979), 
are used to explain the changes in employment relations in Belarus in the last two 
decades. Using these concepts allowed us to estimate the actual spread of prevail-
ing state ideology in the area of employment relations. It also helped to catego-
rise the changes in attitudes towards voice within the available data and thus 
identify the dynamics of employee voice at Belarusian workplaces.  
Although the chapter is mostly devoted to the assessment of formal voice at 
the collective level, informal voice at the individual level is also examined. The 
role of trade unions in negotiating formal and informal voice at both levels is dis-
cussed.  
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins with the research questions be-
ing derived from the HRM approach on voice, specifically the labour process 
perspective. Then the research framework, methods and techniques used in the 
research are explained. Next, the findings from the empirical study of formal and 
informal voice in Belarusian enterprises are presented. The discussion of simi-
larities and differences of employee voice in Belarus, the rest of the post-Soviet 
region, and other developing economies, concludes the chapter.  
 
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
There is a consensus in the literature that post-Soviet transition has taken a 
dramatic turn away from the path it was initially expected to follow (e.g., Bu-
rawoy, 2002; Gel’man, 2003; Nutu, 2007; Shkaratan, 2007; Bogaards, 2009; Ku-
bichek, 2010; Spechler and Spechler, 2010; Beichelt, 2012; Connoly, 2013; 
Wood and Demirbag, 2015). The main consequences of growing political author-
itarianism at post-Soviet space are the resurrection of the Soviet bureaucratic plu-
ralist ideology of employment relations, a ubiquitous suppression of independent 
labour movement and a tighter grip on workers’ rights, including the right to 
voice. Labour-related issues have become increasingly politicised and once again 
a closed subject for research.  
The development of employee voice at the post-Soviet space fits well within 
the Ramsay’s (1977) cycle of control theory. Declining workers’ interest in par-
ticipation, loss of mobilising capacity by the unions, an overwhelming manageri-
al control and employee silence are all typical characteristics of the downward 
phase of a Ramsay’s cycle.  
The starting phase of each Ramsay’s cycle at the territory of the modern tran-
sitional periphery was characterised by a dramatic rise in conflict at the enterprise 
and national levels. The first cycle started in the second half of the 19
th
 century 
and reached its peak before the First World War, when individual informal 
agreements between workers and capitalist employers were largely substituted by 
formal voice mechanisms. Two types of trade unions formed during that period: 
independent pro-socialist trade unions and the so-called ‘yellow’ trade unions 
formed by ‘worker aristocracy’ and directed by factory management. Independ-
ent formal employee voice was at its highest during the first Russian Revolution 
of 1905-1907 when Russian economy was in turmoil. At that time, independent 
trade unions and non-union worker groups were able to obtain numerous conces-
sions from capitalist employers and temporarily improve pay and working condi-
tions for workers. Subsequent pre-war economic growth and repressive govern-
ment policies turned the situation around: independent unions became de facto 
semi-legal organisations (Spiridovich, 2015). These developments correspond to 
Ramsay’s observations on employee voice in Western European economies at the 
time thus confirming the uniformity of the capitalist labour relations across the 
world.  
The socialist revolution of the 1917 did not revive the employee voice despite 
the claims of establishing the ‘workers state’. By the end of the 1920s an independ-
ent employee voice at the collective level was destroyed. It was substituted by the di-
rected voice, with the unions as the part of the Party hierarchy, entrusted with maintain-
ing employee silence through extensive social control in exchange for welfare provision, 
‘linking a worker’s personal well-being to that of the state’ (Ruble, 1979: 235). Weak 
worker representation left no avenues for an independent formal voice at the col-
lective level (Filtzer, 1994:190). Soviet trade unions “did not perform the main 
function of trade unions in the accepted sense of the word – defence of the rights, 
the standard of living and the working conditions of the workers” (Godson, 
1981:106). Instead, they acted as a part of the government regulatory mechanism 
ensuring the fulfilment Party orders at the enterprise level. Participation in setting 
basic wages, salaries, monetary premium, and pensions was beyond their authori-
ty. Workers did not have the freedom to choose a trade union or whether to be or 
not to be members at all; instead they were automatically allocated to a specific 
trade union according to the ‘production principle’ (one unit for one industry). 
The unions controlled approximately 95 per cent of all paid employees (except 
for young workers who did not yet have a permanent position). (Heldman, 
1977:29)  
Formal voice systems were designed by the state and tailored to the needs of individ-
ual enterprises by senior management who had full control over production process, 
workers’ wages and working conditions. Any attempts to revolt against the system were 
brutally supressed (e.g., Holubenko, 1975). At the same time, informality prevailed at 
the individual level, with some workers, particularly highly-skilled technical specialists 
and experienced high-ryazryad
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 workers, capable of negotiating much better pay and 
conditions than the rest of the workforce. 
Insufficient avenues for formal voice in labour relations at Soviet enterprises 
led to the dominance of informal voice. Its effectiveness at individual level was 
determined a high degree of mutual dependency between the employees and the 
management in the situation when workers had almost total control over the la-
bour process but no control over working conditions. Informality affected not 
only wages and benefits but also occupational and career mobility of workers. 
Promotions and better training and development opportunities were often offered 
not to the best but to the most ‘useful’ and biddable employees. The combination 
of tight bureaucratic control and informal voice practices allowed the state to 
successfully subdivide the workforce into the privileged ‘worker aristocracy’ and 
the proletariarised majority, strengthening management’s control over the work-
force. 
Informality also dominated the relationships between enterprises, the Party 
and the state. Supposedly being fully subordinate to the state, enterprise directors 
could actually negotiate a significant autonomy on a range of issues. At the same 
time, both enterprises and the State/Party organs were accountable to the addi-
tional system of control from non-party organisations such as the People’s Con-
trol Committee (Komitet narodnogo kontrolya or KNK), the legal organs (KGB, 
State Prosecution Office, the police), internal party commissions, internal minis-
terial inspections, Ministry of Finance, the National Bank and smaller sectoral 
banks, the media and other non-state organisations such as trade unions. The re-
sult was a very peculiar regulatory system with three functionally overlapping 
and mutually dependent layers of control over economy.  
The gradual collapse of Soviet Union during the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s made employees realise the real strength of their bargaining power. 
First independent trade unions (and employer associations) were established. 
However, their rise was short-lived as they were quickly suppressed by newly 
emerging authoritarian regimes that re-created them as the part of state institu-
tional structures. Independent scholarly research conducted on worker participa-
tion during the 1980s- first half of the 1990s was stopped and employee voice at 
the post-Soviet space once again became a terra incognita.  
Ashwin (1998) noted that limited independent collective organisation of Rus-
sian workers in the 1990s has resulted, at best, in spontaneous and unorganised 
protests. The majority of the workforce, however, exhibited a striking patience 
and pursued individual survival strategies using informal routes (pleading to 
managers or using their connections outside of the enterprise to influence their 
superiors). Ashwin explained workers’ behaviour by the weakness of post-Soviet 
trade unions and the strength of the inherited Soviet paternalist traditions. Her 
arguments were later supported by Crowley (2004) and Vinogradova, Kozina and 
Cook (2012) who attributed the fall in union coverage and a considerable decline 
in collective bargaining to unfavourable market conditions, union fragmentation 
and powerful institutional, cultural and ideological legacies from the Soviet past. 
Both studies, however, noticed a temporary growth of worker resistance and in-
creased concessions from management during crises, as well as the fall in organ-
ised protests when economic situation improved thus providing additional sup-
port to the Ramsay’s cycles of control theory.  
One needs to admit that the impact of Soviet legacies on institutional struc-
tures and organisational culture varies greatly across the post-Soviet space. While 
limited in Russia and Ukraine (e.g., Havrylyshyn, 2006; Pleines, 2012; 
Ljubownikow, Crotty and Rodgers, 2013), it is much stronger in the economies 
of the transitional periphery where reforms were either restrained or reversed 
(e.g., Morrison, Croucher and Cretu, 2012; Pomfret, 2012; Varda, 2014; Danilo-
vich, Croucher and Makovskaya, 2015). Thus a path-dependence argument can-
not fully account for persistently declining levels of employee voice in the re-
gion.  
Alternative explanation for workers patience may lay in the national and the 
enterprise-level personnel management practices. Although Labour Codes of 
post-Soviet economies legally declare workers’ right to participate in the man-
agement of an enterprise, directly or via elected representatives
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, these opportuni-
ties are rarely fully utilized. Recent research on workers participation in the en-
terprise management in Russia (Kliuchko, 2007; Bukreev and Rudiyk, 2014) 
shows that capitalist owners and managers routinely engage in ‘management-
generated games’ (Burawoy, 1979) with the aim of acquiring workers’ consent 
for continuing exploitation in exchange for ‘responsible autonomy’ (as defined 
by Friedman 1977) for skilled workers over the pace and timing of work. Other 
practices include profit-sharing, share distribution schemes (Vasiliev, 2011), the 
establishment of production committees with consultative powers, limited infor-
mation-sharing with employees through regular staff meetings or intra-firm bul-
letins (Ivanova, 2004), etc., giving workers a false feeling of control while being 
a form of ‘special bonus, of which they exerted no control’ (Ramsay, 1977:485).  
In Belarus, the management does not see the need to hide behind worker par-
ticipation schemes. Unlike Russia, where a large proportion of enterprises are 
private and capitalist employment relations prevail, Belarusian industry remains 
under a tight grip of the state which has become the largest inconspicuous em-
ployer in the country as a result of indirect re-nationalisation of industry through 
‘faked privatisation’ (Bakanova et al., 2006; Pastore and Verashchagina, 2006). 
In this role, the state grants government-appointment directors full authority over 
workers at the enterprise level, including the right to subdue collective and indi-
vidual resistance to enforced personnel management policies. In Friedman (1977) 
terms, enterprise management in Belarus has been given a carte blanche to exer-
cise a Taylorist-style direct control strategy over the production process. Gov-
ernment-recognised trade unions play their role by disguising control under the 
mask of social partnership and ‘collectivist spirit’ within the carefully preserved 
Soviet workplace ideology of bureaucratic pluralism. The ‘exit’ route for workers 
(Hirschman, 1970) is restricted by constantly worsening conditions of the labour 
market and the fear of losing enterprise-specific social benefits linked to their 
current roles (Nozdrin-Plotnitsky and Vorobieva, 2009), generating compelled 
workers’ loyalty to enterprises. As the result, workers in Belarus seem to be 
completely deprived of voice. 
Independent or ‘democratic’ trade unions, however, claim that they have man-
aged to achieve certain success in combatting a direct control strategy and giving 
workers some voice at the collective level. Also, previous research found some 
evidence of informal voice at individual level (Danilovich and Croucher, 2011). 
Our questions therefore are: to what degree has independent formal voice been 
eliminated at Belarusian enterprises; whether workers have indeed accepted the 
status quo or are still trying to challenge it through formal and informal channels 
available to them; to what extent have independent trade unions been successful 
in protecting workers right to voice. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Those researching employee voice in Belarus come across considerable diffi-
culties. Even those more patient about the country’s political regime (e.g., Man-
del, 2004: 213-222)., mention the problems that researchers may face Indeed, the 
government exercises pervasive control over the disclosure of any economic and 
social-related information on the country. Common obstacles include denial of 
permissions to conduct research (a particularly popular measure when dealing 
with Western academics), censorship of questionnaire materials and interview 
protocols by the management when conducting research at the enterprise level, 
avoidance of researchers by local officials (those working for government recog-
nised trade unions are notorious for eschewing interviews). Private companies 
fear official audit or tax bodies while workers fear losing their jobs or being pe-
nalised by wage cuts. Consequently, the author had to ‘walk sideways’, in order 
to obtain the information and not harm the participants.  
The common Belarusians’ attitude to research is predominantly hostile; people 
do not believe in the possibility of confidentiality and anonymity. Researchers 
are perceived as being accountable either to the enterprise director or state insti-
tutions. Although the official permission to conduct research was obtained, it was 
extremely hard to convince employees of state-owned and quasi-private enter-
prises to disclose information about their working conditions, pay, relations with 
the management, workplace nepotism, grievance and conflict resolution proce-
dures at the enterprises, etc.  
Another obstacle is a partial availability of secondary data and low reliability 
of those available. Although the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis and Belarus-
ian judicial bodies and government-recognised trade unions publish many statis-
tical documents, including employment tribunal resolutions, these reveal little 
about the actual state of employee voice in the country due to the dominant bu-
reaucratic pluralist ideology of ‘socialist market economy’. Hence, first-hand in-
formation from workers, managers and independent trade unions had to be ob-
tained to counterweigh the official idyllic picture of the management-worker uni-
ty.  
 
Sample 
 
Ten large enterprises from six main employing industries (petrochemical, 
chemical, light, machine-building, wood processing and construction), with the 
total number of employees of over nineteen thousand people were selected for a 
detailed empirical study. All enterprises are under state control through ministries 
or industrial conglomerates (kontserns) which have substituted Soviet industrial 
ministries. Enterprises included in the sample are either state-owned or quasi-
privatised. Both forms of ownership are treated here as being the same since a 
large government share in quasi-privatised enterprises varying between 84 and 99 
percent, makes the state the sole executive shareholder of these entities determin-
ing almost every aspect of their business strategies and personnel management.. 
Four out of ten enterprises are the so-called ‘city forming’ entities – single major 
employers in their locations.  
 
Measurement 
 
As this study follows the labour process theory perspective, a historical ap-
proach to voice is assumed. First, only enterprises with the Soviet ‘history’ are 
selected to allow tracing the dynamics of employee voice in time. Second, the 
voice is analysed in a cyclical dynamics with special attention paid to the influ-
ence of key events at certain points of time on the subsequent direction of the 
evolution of voice to account for the impact of path-dependence. Presidential De-
crees which had the most impact on voice are chosen as proxies for key events.  
Three key concepts: conflict, control and consent are analysed. Following the 
labour process theory, the conflict is treated as the continuous struggle at the 
workplace between the interests of workers and those of the capitalist employer 
(in our case, the state), which ‘is closely intertwined with bargaining…which 
sometimes occurs collectively [and] sometimes takes an individual form’ (Ed-
wards, 1979: 14-15). Three indicators for conflict with regards to voice at the 
workplace were selected:  
 the number of complaints to the management per year per enter-
prise (as the proxy for voice-related conflicts at the individual level); 
 the number of active protests (strikes, petitions, picketing, unau-
thorised personnel meetings, hunger strikes, organised absenteeism) per 
year per enterprise (the proxy for voice-related conflicts at the collective 
level)
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; 
 personnel turnover (as the indicator of passive conflict showing 
the share of employees who prefer taking the ‘exit’ option to voicing their 
concerns).  
The concept of control was analysed both at the enterprise and the macro-
level. Labour process theorists define control as an extreme form of coordination 
inherent to capitalist production where the employer presumes that by purchasing 
workers’ labour power he ‘receives a contractual right backed by legal force…to 
direct its use’. (Edwards, 1979: 17) We follow Edwards’s definition of control as 
the ability of the capitalist employer and/or the management to secure desired 
work behaviour from the personnel and determine to what degree the authoritari-
an style of supervision (Burawoy, 1979) has prevailed in levelling the independ-
ent and imposing the directed employee voice at Belarusian enterprises. To 
achieve this, three indicators of control at the workplace were selected: 
 the number of documents controlling formal voice at the enter-
prise (the collective agreement, instructions to the management on deal-
ing with conflict situations, complaints, job descriptions
5
, etc.). Only 
documents which managers/workers have to sign were chosen as they al-
low estimating the dynamics of control over the years. The documents 
were then assessed against employment tribunal decisions to understand 
the actual power of the external justice system institutions in defending 
employee voice against the management.  
 Trade union density at the workplace (in both state-approved and 
independent unions). This measure was chosen because it allows as-
sessing the ratio of the independent versus the directed voice at the enter-
prise level.  
Since the government was defined as the major ‘capitalist’ employer, its influ-
ence on employee voice at the workplace was also assessed. It was defined as the 
number of legal acts which directly or indirectly limit voice opportunities at the 
workplace.  
The concept of consent with regards to voice was examined partially using the 
data obtained on conflict and control, as the decreased opposition to the suppres-
sion of the independent voice would mean an increased acceptance of the status 
quo by the workforce. At the same time, it is vital to see whether this acceptance 
takes the form of a passive protest, exit, or leads to an increased informal voice at 
the individual level. To do so, the choice of these three options was offered to 
workers as the part of their interviews. The results were compared with the inter-
view data from earlier studies on Belarusian enterprises. This provided a histori-
cal perspective on workers’ perception of voice and exit options available to 
them. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The study adopts a mixed methods approach, which is, however, heavily 
skewed towards qualitative techniques due to lack of reliable quantitative data. 
Semi-structured interviews are the preferred research technique, and are supple-
mented with documentary and statistical analyses. Altogether, 38 interviews were 
conducted: 3 with government recognised trade union officials, 9 with the repre-
sentatives of independent ‘democratic’ trade unions, 16 with workers of various 
skill, age and education levels, and 10 with line and middle managers. Each in-
terview lasted between 45 and 70 minutes. Interviews with ‘official’ trade union 
officials and the managers were conducted at their workplaces. Others took place 
‘sub rosa’ since ordinary workers were not comfortable being interviewed at 
their workplaces and most independent trade unions do not have official offices 
as landlords deny them rent due to fear of persecution from the authorities.  
The interviews served two purposes. First, they were a source of first-hand da-
ta on policies and practices of employee voice which would have otherwise been 
impossible to obtain. Second, they performed a function of data quality control. 
The interviews thus included a number of questions regarding how employee 
voice could be expressed, what procedures existed at the enterprises included in 
the sample, and what methods were used by trade unions to help workers express 
the voice. Workers and managers were also asked to provide opinions on infor-
mal voice mechanisms available at their enterprises and assess whether those 
prevailed over formal voice mechanisms. Using interview as a research method 
in authoritarian states is often seen as unreliable due to high probability of biased 
responses. In this case, a potential criticism is addressed by including respond-
ents representing opposing interest groups (employees vs. managers, and gov-
ernment recognised trade unions vs. their ‘democratic’ counterparts). All inter-
view data were manually analysed by coding in relation to the research questions 
and the resulting themes.  
The main categories of documents selected for analysis are collective agree-
ments, trade union documents, enterprise HR documentation, labour market leg-
islation, trade union documents, decisions of employment tribunals, legislation 
on main voice mechanisms (strikes, complains, protests, etc.). Enterprise docu-
mentation and employment tribunal decisions proved to be the most informative; 
as they allowed seeing the influence court decisions have on enterprise policies 
towards personnel. The documentation obtained from ‘democratic’ trade unions 
was useful in terms of demonstrating the state, dynamics and directions of work-
place conflicts and the effectiveness of formal voice mechanisms in resolving 
them. It was also a good source of information on the organising capacity of the 
state-independent trade union movement and its influence over employment rela-
tions. The documents from the government-recognised unions were the least in-
formative first-hand source, most of them paraphrasing government propaganda 
taglines. The documents (except for the legislation) were analysed using Mayr-
ing’s qualitative content analysis (Kohlbacher, 2006).  
In addition to interviews and documentary analysis I analysed whatever little 
statistics was available on organised labour protests; voice-related dismissals; 
changes in working conditions (working hours, overtime, pay, non-monetary 
benefits) as the result of voice (the two latter statistics were obtained from ar-
chival records of the sampled enterprises and systematised manually).  
 
 
FINDINGS 
Employee voice in independent Belarus at the macro-level 
 
The second Ramsay cycle started in Belarus at the same time as everywhere 
else in the Soviet Union (second half of the 1980s). In 1991 – 1994 it coincided 
with disintegration – the first stage of Burawoy’s (2002) involuntary retroregres-
sion, when Belarus experienced similar disintegrative trends as the rest of the 
former Soviet Union. This period was characterised by a weak attempt to intro-
duce neo-liberal reforms suggested by international lending organisations. The 
endeavour largely failed since the new independent government, formed by for-
mer Party officials, was unwilling to go beyond the minimum that allowed secur-
ing international assistance.  
In the area of employee voice, the disintegration stage was marked by a con-
siderable widening of formal mechanisms at the collective level and shrinking of 
informal voice as the result of the activity of newly created independent trade 
unions. For the first time in Belarusian history workers were able to negotiate 
changes in the formal voice system at the national level. The organised worker 
movement was further strengthened by the establishment of the Belarusian Dem-
ocratic Trade-Union Congress (BDTC) in 1993. BDTC was able to organise a 
number of strikes aimed at improving working conditions. They counteracted the 
government-recognised Belarusian Trade Union Federation (BTF) which saw its 
role in reducing social tensions, or as one of its officials put it, ‘trying to calm 
down the hot heads in the streets who tried to destabilize the situation in the 
country by putting out demands which could not be satisfied during crisis’ (he 
refers to pay rise and improved health and safety).  
One of the best examples of a high organising capacity of trade unions at the 
macro level at that stage was the 1992 strike organised by the Independent Min-
ers Union. The requests put out by the workers included the introduction of the 
termless work contract, increased pay and improved working conditions. The 
strike continued for 44 days including the 18-day hunger-strike. It resulted in the 
signing of the first in Belarusian history industry-wide tariff agreement which 
linked the minimum wage to the minimum consumer budget and led to the 3.4 
times growth of average wage across the Belarusian mining industry. In 1993, 
the first ever freely negotiated industry-wide collective agreement was also 
signed by the mining Ministry. Some of its key points included decreasing the 
working day by an hour for miners and an increase of the annual leave to 66 days 
for those working underground (Dovnar and Eroshenya, 2011). Generally, the 
number of strikes and other forms of protest grew almost three times in this peri-
od compared to the previous decade (Fig. 1) 
 
Fig. 1: Dynamics of collective workers’ protests in Belarus (1970s-2015) Source: 
data obtained from interviews with independent trade union representatives, vari-
ous media sources 
 
The second stage of involuntary retroregression – reform – started in 1994 af-
ter President Lukashenka was elected. It can be roughly divided into two periods: 
(a) 1994-1996 when Lukashenka had not obtained a full grip on power and had 
to reckon with the opinion of a relatively independent parliament, and (b) 1996 – 
2004 when the previous partial reforms slowed down and then were either frozen 
or reversed. The division is made based on the changes in the country’s Constitu-
tion towards the greater authority of the President in political, social and econom-
ic affairs which by 2004 had led to the establishment of his authoritative regime 
and a full transformation of Belarus into the ‘last dictatorship in Europe’6.  
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The reform stage was characterised by rapidly decreasing opportunities for 
formal voice at the national level. Although at the start of the period the authori-
ties maintained the simulacrum of industrial democracy, by the 2000 the level of 
control over voice at the national level increased considerably, mirrored by a fall-
ing number of strikes and other organised forms of protest (see Fig. 1). A repres-
sive campaign against independent unions started after the 1995 transport work-
ers’ strike which was openly suppressed by special police forces. The leaders of 
the independent unions were detained, some were arrested. On the 21
st
 August 
1995 the activity of the Independent Trade Union of Belarus was suspended by 
the Presidential Decree No.336 (the union was re-registered two years later after 
the ILO and international union federations interfered). Starting from 1997, the 
government began to assume indirect control over the majority of industrial en-
terprises. By 2004 it became the main shareholder in approximately 83 percent of 
the privatised large and medium enterprises, with the average value of shares 
over 90 percent. During that period the agreement between the government and 
BTF was concluded which saw the trade union federation de facto included in 
governmental structures, exactly as it was in the Soviet Union.  
Two main legal acts regulating the functioning of worker representative or-
ganisations were issued in this period: the Law of the Republic of Belarus ‘On 
Professional Unions’ (14.01.2000) and the Presidential Decree No.2 ‘On 
measures of the regulation of activities of political parties, trade unions and other 
civil society organisations’ (26.01.1999). These legal acts, particularly the Presi-
dential Decree No.2 made it extremely hard to officially register any civil society 
organisation which was not the part of the government structure. This made im-
possible for independent workers organisations to officially protect workers’ 
rights in court and establish their branches at enterprises. The final incorporation 
of the BTF into the government structure occurred in 2002 when the former 
chairman of the President’s administration, Leanid Kozik was ‘elected’ as the 
BTF chairman.  
Since 2005 Belarus has been going through stabilisation – the third stage of 
Burawoy’s involutionary retroregression. In his work on Russia, Burawoy de-
fines this stage as being characterised by the development of barter and oligar-
chic mafia-type structures which take over the role of the lender of last resort 
from the state. In Belarus, such elite also exists, though, unlike their Russian 
counterparts, Belarusian oligarchs are totally subordinate to the state which acts 
as a capitalist corporation.  
Employee voice at the national level is currently characterised by disorganisa-
tion (see Fug. 1) and disillusionment of the workforce in the ability of any trade 
union to protect their rights. Out of 12 workers’ protests in the 2011-2015 only 
two were conducted by BDTC-affiliated unions. The rest were spontaneous ac-
tions organised by the workers at individual enterprises. Unlike organised pro-
tests of the past (especially those of 1991-1994) which fought for creating new 
and strengthening existing formal voice channels, disorganised strikes of 2011-
2015 demanded pay increases and/or paying off wage arrears. Workers seem to 
be more preoccupied with economic matters rather than with defending their 
right to voice. The fact that spontaneous conflicts are often mediated by local of-
ficials who negotiate payment terms with the management and almost never by 
the independent or the state-controlled trade unions means a shift of workers’ 
trust away from the unions and towards the government which may be seen as 
the victory for the paternalist ideology of unitarism at the national level.  
 
Employee voice in Belarus: enterprise level 
 
The analysis of the dynamics of employee voice at Belarusian workplaces re-
sulted in a number of important findings. First, the analysis of company docu-
mentation and statistics shows a considerable drop the number of formal voice 
mechanisms at the enterprises in question in the last fifteen years. During the dis-
integration stage when independent employee voice was on the rise in Belarus, 
nine out of ten enterprises in the sample introduced consultation and suggestion 
schemes with regards to quality control, innovation, and occupational health and 
safety. Four enterprises in the sample had whistle-blower protection schemes put 
in place and seven introduced improved grievance procedures in collective 
agreements (five of them did it with the independent industry trade union being 
involved). Workers received the ability to settle individual disputes with the 
management in court. The employment tribunal statistics showed a considerable 
growth in disputes with regards to pay, working conditions (predominantly over-
time pay related), health and safety (especially with regard to workplace traumas, 
an issue which was silenced during the Soviet times) and unfair and constructive 
dismissals. As the personnel manager from the chemical fibre plant said, “the 
most noticeable change was the amount of paperwork I suddenly had to deal 
with. Everyone started writing, and writing, and requesting, no one wanted to just 
come and talk it through. And everyone suddenly knew their rights too much, 
everyone was suddenly a lawyer. Did not last long but drained a lot of blood…”  
The time after 2000 is seen by the managers as the period of the return of the 
managerial power over employees. The most popular terms used to describe the 
changes were ‘clearer instructions’, ‘I finally got my voice back’, ‘rules became 
rules again’, ‘the boss has become the boss’, ‘I started to be listened to without 
interruption’, and so on.  
The suppression of formal employee voice at the national level had dramatic 
consequences for formal voice at the workplace. One of the older workers, a tex-
tile factory employee, says: “It suddenly became very hard to come out and, basically, 
ask what is going on, not like in the beginning of the 1990s when you could raise the 
issue. Everyone became suspicious of everyone, just like it was under the Soviets. Don’t 
say, look another way, you know how it was. The unions became better again, though, 
with the New Year presents for kids, helping with the trips, summer camps for kids, all 
the entertainment. So it became OK again”.  
Another, a technical specialist in her late 30s, notices: “I came to this enterprise 
in 2002 and it felt exactly like my mother told me about how it was in her days, with 
unions doing the entertainment and the presents, and the rest. I remember when I was at 
college, there were strikes, people in the streets, real Wild West. Then I worked at a pri-
vate firm, we had no union, just work, no protection at all, so I quit. Then I got this job 
through a good friend of mine and, of course, there is a difference, it is a state enterprise, 
after all. Well, not exactly state but you know what I mean. The management has be-
come tougher in time though, my opinion does not matter anymore, so I just follow the 
production process instruction….Yes, there were a few people who tried to get another 
union in, and it even worked for some time, but they did not stay for long in the end”.  
As the result, there has been a considerable increase of inter-personal and in-
tra-organisational conflict in the last decade (see Tables 1 and 2). 
At the same time, most managers point out that workers are now less willing 
to formally complain and when they do, they rarely escalate to employment tri-
bunals. The main reasons for this, they believe, are harsh economic conditions 
and the fear of not being able to find another job in the industry. As the manager 
from the petrochemical plant puts it: “People may think whatever they want, but 
they know that if they go too far, the director will also go too far. And good jobs 
do not lie on the road, especially in such times as now. The enterprise is trying its 
best for the workers and the majority of the collective understand this. Of course, 
there have always been those making noises but our gates are always open, we 
are not holding anyone by force”. 
 
Table 1. Intra-Organisational and Inter-Personal Conflict at Belarusian En-
terprises – Workers’ Viewpoints, Percentage of Total Responses. 
Question Significantly 
Increased 
Slightly 
Increased 
Did 
Not 
Change 
Slightly 
Decreased 
Significantly 
Decreased 
How has level of in-
ter-personal conflict 
changed at your enter-
prise in the last ten years 
22.7 51.8 17.3 6.9 1.3 
How has the level of 
conflict between man-
agement and workers 
changed at your enter-
prise in the last ten years 
57.4 36.3 4.1 1.3 0.9 
Source: interview data 
 
Table 2. Intra-Organisational and Inter-Personal Conflict at Belarusian En-
terprises - Managers’ Viewpoints, Percentage of Total Responses 
Question Significantly 
Increased 
Slightly 
Increased 
Did 
Not 
Change 
Slightly 
Decreased 
Significantly 
Decreased 
How has level of inter-
personal conflict changed 
at your enterprise 
18.3 21.4 43.5 11.7 5.1 
How has the level of 
conflict between manage-
ment and workers changed 
at your enterprise 
48.2 32.1 17.6 1.4 0.7 
Source: interview data 
Enterprise statistics on the dynamic of complaints confirms the management’s 
position. (Table 3) 
Growing levels of conflict between the management and the workforce are 
dealt with in an authoritative manner by increasing the degree of control. The 
analysis of collective agreements shows that each of them was amended at least 
once during the last decade to include paragraphs on the updated definitions of 
labour discipline and the punishment for not keeping to it. Following the issue of 
the Presidential Decree No.5 the list of violations was extended to include ‘ac-
tivities that is or may be potentially damaging to the enterprise’. No definition of 
what constitutes such activities is specified in either the Decree or the collective 
agreements but the independent trade union representatives interviewed claim 
that it involves any kind of independent formal collective voice.  
In addition, the number of instructions to the management in areas of conflict 
management, grievances, and unauthorised union activity has increased 3.7 times 
in the last decade. Job descriptions for highly skilled specialists and skilled 
workers (which one has to sign when being hired) now include worker’s agree-
ment to be dismissed if found to have violated labour discipline. Official trade 
unions do not interfere in the suppression of employee voice. Earlier studies 
(Danilovich, Croucher and Makovskaya, 2015) found that workers view these 
unions only as welfare providers which shows a striking similarity to workers’ 
attitude towards unions during the Soviet times. Although membership in state-
recognised unions is, in theory, voluntary, the usual practice is to enforce the 
membership on workers upon the signing of the contract. 
 
Table 3. Formal Complaints to the Management at Sampled Enterprises - Esca-
lated to Formal Disputes. 
En
ter-
prise 
Pay-related complaints Complaints on inadequate 
working conditions (including 
health and safety) 
Complaints on un-
fair/constructive dismissals 
198
5-1994 
1995
-2004 
200
5-2015 
198
5-1994 
1995-
2004 
200
5-2015 
1985-
1994 
1995-
2004 
2005-
2015 
1 76 14 14 152 59 26 37 26 12 
2 46 21 7 63 19 18 44 20 8 
3 33 9 3 47 25 6 28 13 4 
4 42 8 1 98 27 5 31 18 10 
5 17 6 0 51 18 4 39 16 8 
6 69 15 5 97 33 11 26 19 7 
7 73 20 12 114 58 15 35 35 16 
8 29 7 3 32 17 6 9 4 1 
9 96 45 18 127 69 14 23 17 14 
10 51 15 6 92 55 13 26 19 10 
Tot
al 
532 160 69 873 380 118 298 187 90 
Source: compiled by the author from enterprise archives data 
 
If the worker refuses, the job offer may be revoked. The explanation for this is 
simple: by law, every employee must be covered by a collective agreement 
which is, in theory, developed in the consultation with the official union. If the 
worker refuses to be the member of the union, they cannot sign the collective 
agreement and hence are not allowed to sign the contract. Forced membership 
has led to an approximately 95 percent coverage of the labour force by the state-
controlled unions, a figure similar to the Soviet times.  
The suppression of formal voice and workers’ rights in general, has not, how-
ever, led to massive exit of the workforce. The average coefficient of employee 
turnover across the sample in the last five years was 0.11. The highest coefficient 
of turnover was among young highly skilled specialists (university graduates un-
der 30) – 0.17 (increased from 0.12 in 2005-2010) and young skilled workers 
(technical college graduates under 30) – 0.23 (increased from 0.09 in 2005-
2010). The increase in turnover for these two categories is biennial since their 
graduate distribution contracts are signed for two years. After the contracts ex-
pire, young specialists are no longer bound to their enterprises. The lowest coef-
ficients of turnover (as may be expected) were among the workers over 40 (re-
gardless of their skill level): 0.047 for highly skilled workers (increased from 
0.041 in 2005-2010) and 0.038 for skilled workers (increased from 0.033 in 
2005-2010). Workers explain their unwillingness to leave enterprises by the fear 
of not finding better paying jobs in the industry either in Belarus or in the neigh-
bouring Russia. The majority does not seem to be too concerned with the loss of 
formal voice opportunities. As one of the interviewees, a skilled electromechani-
cal worker from the automotive plant says: ‘Of course, it is good when you can 
defend your right. Makes you feel more of a man. But the main thing is to get 
paid and paid well. This is what I want. If they [senior management] live and let 
others live, it is fine by me’.  
One can therefore argue that the culture of formal voice which was developed 
at Belarusian enterprises straight after the fall of the Soviet Union, has been  
gradually substituted by the culture of loyalty in Hirschman’s (1970) terms, as 
the state when workers passively suffer in silence hoping for the conditions to 
improve in future. Few take the exit option due to fear of not being able of secur-
ing another job with at least similar pay and social guarantees.  
The second important finding from the data is that decreased levels of formal 
voice have not led to a significant increase in informal voice at Belarusian work-
places. The reason for this is a gradually diminishing workers’ control over the 
labour process. While in the Soviet Union workers had considerable control over 
the labour process and the fulfilment of the production plan, in modern Belarus 
the plan is no longer a target and the labour process is heavily regulated, the 
workers have literally nothing to bargain with. Moreover, any attempt to assume 
control over the labour process may be regarded by the management as the viola-
tion of labour discipline and lead to an immediate dismissal.  
Belarusian legislation contributes heavily to the suppression of employee 
voice at every level. The country’s Labour Code is often superseded by Presiden-
tial Decrees (Danilovich and Croucher, 2011; 2015) which management prefers 
to follow in order to avoid problems with the government controlling bodies. The 
following legal acts have been especially damaging for employee voice over the 
years.  
1. The Presidential Decree No. 29 ‘On additional measures on the improve-
ment of labour relations, strengthening of labour and performance discipline’ 
(26.07.1999) Supplemented by the Enactment of the Council of Ministers ‘on the 
order of the contract employment between employers and employees’ No.1476 
(25.09.1999) abolishes termless contracts for every category of personnel and de 
facto justified the introduction of precarious employment and dismissal at will in 
Belarus. The Decree has been widely used to legally dismiss independent trade 
union activists.  
2. A Directive of the President of the Republic of Belarus No.1. ‘On the 
measures on strengthening public safety and discipline’ (11.03.2004, amended 
14.10.2015). The document gives senior management of enterprises the right to 
maintain labour discipline by any means necessary including the dismissal of the 
employee guilty of a disciplinary offense. As the interviewed ‘democratic’ labour 
unions activists point out, the Directive is widely used as the persecution tool, 
since the state of the machinery and equipment at most enterprises makes it im-
possible to keep up with every health and safety rule. Five of the interviewed 
workers support this opinion. In their view, the directive is widely used by the 
managers to blame the workers for received traumas in order not to pay compen-
sation. 
3. The Presidential Decree No.9 ‘On additional measures to support the 
wood processing industry’ (7.12.2012), cancelled by the Presidential Decree 
No.182 (27.05.2016) which de facto introduced bonded labour in the wood-
processing industry, stimulating informality and corruption at the workplace. 
Two workers from a wood-processing plant admitted bribing personnel managers 
to keep their worker record books in place while going to Russia as irregular la-
bour migrants for a period of time. 
4. The Presidential Decree No. 5 ‘On the intensification of requirements to 
senior managers and workers in organisations’ (15.12.2014). The Decree gives 
employers the right to significantly alter working conditions according to produc-
tion, organisational or economic needs without consulting the workers or the un-
ions. An employer may also fully or partially withhold workers’ bonuses for up 
to 12 months as a disciplinary measure; suspend or dismiss the worker immedi-
ately if the worker violates labour discipline and his actions cause (or may poten-
tially cause) damage to the organisation or if any other ‘discrediting circumstanc-
es’ are identified. The dismissal may occur before the end of the contract. Indi-
viduals may be denied employment if the characteristics from the previous place 
of employment may contain anything a potential employer may not like. Em-
ployee voice, under these conditions, becomes impossible, since any formal ex-
pression of dissatisfaction can be counted as misconduct. One of the worst effects 
of the Decree is that it prevents a dismissed employee from obtaining any mana-
gerial position (including lower management) in any state-owned or private or-
ganisation without the explicit permission of the head of the local executive 
committee, which is virtually impossible to obtain. Hence low and middle man-
agers as well as technical specialists who can, in theory occupy managerial posi-
tions, have the voice option withdrawn from them.  
Enterprise documentation shows an increasing number of dismissals due to 
disciplinary violations in the last two years. 90 percent of the democratic unions’ 
representatives interviewed for the study admitted being threatened with dismis-
sal. A few of them lost their jobs during that period due to their political and so-
cial activities. The representative of the Free Union of Metalworkers, established 
at the Minsk Automobile Plant, one of the largest employers in the country, 
openly spoke of persecution by the management and prosecution by the authori-
ties. He stated that the actions against the unions started as early as 1998 when 
their request to have a meeting on the territory of the plant was denied by Minsk 
city executive committee because ‘the plant’s products were used in the defence 
complex of the Republic of Belarus…therefore any arrangements of the sort 
could not be allowed on its territory’. As he put it, ‘this is all a bitter irony. So we 
can’t have anything there, no meetings, nothing but what about the official un-
ions? Why can they? So, you see, we are like enemies, like some agent 007 spies. 
I worked there for almost 30 years and it was hard for me to hear all that at first, 
to be treated like that’.  
To summarise, the results of the empirical study show a gradual devolution of 
formal and informal employee voice in Belarus during the second Ramsay (1977) 
cycle of control. Despite high levels of conflict at the workplace, the system of 
direct control imposed by the management together with the repressive measures 
against independent trade unions successfully prevented workers from expressing 
their voice via formal channels. Informal channels also shrank due to a decreased 
workers’ control over the labour process and a consequent loss of leverage over 
the management. State-recognised trade unions which are the part of the govern-
ment mechanism did not prevent the devolution of employee voice and the inde-
pendent unions had few opportunities to counteract it due to their semi-legal sta-
tus.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter aimed to reveal distinctive features of employee voice in Belarus, 
one of the economies of post-Soviet transitional periphery. Following the labour 
process theory, employee voice was viewed as the product of antagonistic em-
ployment relations between capitalist employers and the workforce. The works of 
Ramsay (1977), Friedman (1977), Edwards (1979) and Burawoy (1979) were 
used as the points of reference for the theoretical framework. Voice was analysed 
the concepts of conflict, control and consent. The historical approach was applied 
to account for the influence of the Soviet past as well as to conduct a direct com-
parison between the evolution of voice in Belarus and in developed Western 
economies, the object of the ‘classic’ labour process theory. 
The data clearly demonstrate that employee voice in Belarus evolved in line 
with Ramsay’s cycles of control theory. Ramsay saw employee voice as the re-
sult of fluctuations of the relative power of capitalist employers and the work-
force which, in turn, largely depended on broad economic and social conditions. 
When employers are put under pressure by these conditions, they are more eager 
to allow concessions to the workforce, while at the times of crisis (high unem-
ployment) their resistance to voice is much stronger.  
The evolution of employee voice in Belarus and its state at the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century largely matches Ramsay’s description of voice in European capi-
talist economies at the end of the 19
th
 - beginning of the 20
th
 century. The rise of 
independent employee voice in the country historically coincides with the time 
periods when external economic, social and political conditions (first a rapid in-
dustrialisation at the beginning of the 20
th
 century and then the easing of the So-
viet regime at the end of the century) force employers to take into account the 
demands of the workforce for a larger participation in enterprise management 
and the improvement of working conditions. In both cycles, a monopolistic em-
ployer (in this case the state) manages to suppress formal employee voice 
through the system of direct bureaucratic control and the diversification of the 
workforce as soon as the socio-economic and political situation turn in its favour. 
Ultimately, the implementation of a direct control strategy by both Soviet gov-
ernment and Belarusian government after 1994 has resulted in people de facto 
‘working as machines manipulated by centralised planning departments’ (Fried-
man, 1977: 50).  
The study also found that the actual degree of direct control over voice in 
modern Belarus is even larger than it was in the Soviet Union. The explanation 
may lie in decreased opportunities for informal voice due to the workers losing 
control over the labour process which results in the disappearance of any lever-
age they might’ve had over the management in the past.  
The historical approach necessarily meant an inquest into the effect of path-
dependence, and specifically, Soviet institutional, cultural and ideological lega-
cies. These were found to have exhibited considerable influence on the formation 
of the system of personnel management and workplace ideology of modern Bela-
rus. Main principles of Soviet bureaucratic pluralism were carefully preserved 
and adapted to current socio-economic and political conditions which allowed the 
Belarusian government to largely avoid social tensions and obtain workers con-
sent for further exploitation despite growing levels of conflict at the workplace.  
Another explanation for the Belarusian government’s success in suppressing 
independent employee voice may stem from its ability to re-integrate the majori-
ty of trade union organisations into its structures using the Soviet ‘blueprint’. The 
organisations that refused to become the part of the executive ‘vertical’ were re-
duced to semi-legal entities and openly persecuted. Enforced membership in the 
official unions and persecution by management of those who dare leave them 
makes it hard for independent unions to recruit further reducing their influence 
on voice-related matters.  
However, an increase in workers’ protest actions does not allow accepting 
Ashwin’s (1998) argument on workers’ patience with regards to Belarus. Despite 
not being organised by formal unions, the protests demonstrate the ability of the 
Belarusian workforce to express voice. Although workers’ appeal to local offi-
cials for mediation does show a certain degree of trust in the authorities, the gov-
ernment’s unwillingness to radically change the situation in workers’ favour may 
result in larger collective actions in the future. 
Belarus is not unique in its suppression of employee voice. Similar state prac-
tices were reported earlier in other countries of transitional periphery, particularly 
in authoritarian economies of central Asia (e.g, Pomfret, 2012). Government 
suppression of independent trade unions is common in China (e.g., Xu, 2013; Fu, 
2016). Cooke and Sainti (2015) report that Indian government fails to ensure fair 
treatment of workers’ grievances, leaving employees at management’s mercy. 
Thus, despite having some distinctive features, such as the extent of direct con-
trol over the workforce or the ability to obtain workers consent for the suppres-
sion of formal voice at the workplace, the policy towards the independent em-
ployee voice in Belarus seems to be largely similar to that in other transitional 
and developing countries.  
  
NOTES 
1. 7 is the lowest possible score in the Freedom House ranking 
2. Ryazryad is the Soviet term for the worker’s skill grade. There were six 
skill grades for manual workers and those operating machinery, with the 
six ryazryad being the highest. Workers’ pay, benefits and working con-
ditions often depended on their ryazryad. 
3. See e.g., Articles 21, 52, 53 of the Labour Code of Russian Federation; 
Article 11 of the Labour Code of the Republic of the republic of Belarus; 
Article 425 of the Labour Code of the republic of Ukraine; Article 22 of 
the Labour code of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Article 9 of the labour 
Code of the republic of Moldova. 
4. The data on this proxy was obtained from ‘democratic’ trade unions and 
hence may not be fully accurate as these unions treat even the smallest 
event as the form of protest 
5. It is a usual practice at Belarusian enterprises (inherited from the Soviet 
personnel management) when the workers signs not only the contract and 
the collective agreement but also signs a statement that they were made 
aware of their job description and agree to fulfil its every point. In many 
cases these documents include the point stating that the workers agrees to 
follow the rules of the labour discipline accepted at the enterprise and ac-
cepts the punishment that may follow if they don’t (in many cases this 
means agreeing to the culture of employee silence). 
6. The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus was changed three times in 
10 years. The first change took place on 15 March 1994, right after the 
presidential elections. According to that change, the President received 
significant credentials, the most important of which were: the right to 
amend the Constitution, determine the dates for elections and referen-
dums, the exclusive right to appoint the judges, including the ones for the 
Supreme and the Constitutional Courts, the General Prosecutor, and other 
leading persons in judicial system, the exclusive right to appoint the Head 
of the Central Bank, establish and dismiss ministries, has the right to can-
cel the decisions of local authorities in case they are recognized as violat-
ing the law. In other words, the 1994 amendment has subordinated the 
executive and the judicial powers to the President. The only branch that 
remained independent was the legislative branch (the parliament). It lost 
its independence in 1996 when Lukashenka forced it to self-liquidate and 
then re-introduced it as a National Assembly which was subordinate to 
him, as after the second amendment of the Constitution which he initiated 
in 1996 and which led to the destruction of the parliament, he received the 
right to appoint the chairmen for the both houses of the parliament. Thus, 
all three branches of power lost their independence and became subordi-
nate to one man who now could stop the reforms and change the country 
into an overly regulated Soviet-type economy with even more central 
planning than the USSR (which he did). The second period in the reform 
stage of involutionary retroregression finished in 2004 after the third 
amendment of the Constitution has removed a two-term limit for the pres-
ident to be in power, making Lukashenka a lifelong dictator. 
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